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Abstract
The present article introduces a reference framework for discussing re-
silience of computational systems. Rather than a property that may or
may not be exhibited by a system, resilience is interpreted here as the
emerging result of a dynamic process. Said process represents the dy-
namic interplay between the behaviors exercised by a system and those of
the environment it is set to operate in. As a result of this interpretation,
coherent definitions of several aspects of resilience can be derived and pro-
posed, including elasticity, change tolerance, and antifragility. Definitions
are also provided for measures of the risk of unresilience as well as for the
optimal match of a given resilient design with respect to the current en-
vironmental conditions. Finally, a resilience strategy based on our model
is exemplified through a simple scenario.
1 Introduction
Resilience is one of those “general systems attributes” that appear to play a cen-
tral role in several disciplines. Examples include ecology, business, psychology,
industrial safety [32], microeconomics, computer networks, security, manage-
ment science, cybernetics, control theory, as well as crisis and disaster manage-
ment and recovery [17, 53, 44, 35, 21]. Although common traits are retained,
in each discipline resilience takes peculiar domain-specific meanings [17]. To
exacerbate the problem, even in the context of the same discipline often no con-
sensus has been so far reached as to what are the peculiar aspects of resilience
and what makes it different from, e.g., elasticity, dependability, or antifragility.
The present article contributes towards a solution to this problem in several
ways. First, in Sect. 2, we introduce resilience, compare various of its domain-
specific definitions, and derive a number of ancillary concepts and working as-




















emerging from the interaction of the behaviors exercised by a system and the
environment it is set to operate in. The outcome of said interaction depends
on both intrinsic and extrinsic factors: the “traits” of the system together with
its endowment—the system’s peculiar characteristics as well as its current state
and requirements. At stake is the identity of the system, which we identify
here with compliance to system specifications, including functional and non-
functional system requirements.
The resilience interaction is modeled by considering the behaviors produced
by the system and its environment. This provides us with a unifying framework
within which it is possible to express coherent definitions of concepts such as
elasticity, entelechism (change tolerance), and antifragility. Both system and
environment are further modeled in terms of the “resilience organs” managing
the five major services ancillary to resilience [12, 13]: perception, apperception,
planning, executive, and knowledge management organs—corresponding to the
five modules of autonomic systems [30]. After this, in Sect. 4, we introduce
measures of the optimality of a given resilient design with respect to the current
environmental conditions: system supply and system-environment fit. One such
strategy is detailed and exemplified in Sect. 5 through an ambient intelligence
scenario. Finally, major results are recalled and final conclusions are drawn in
Sect. 6.
2 Basic Concepts
The term “resilience” comes from Latin resil¯ıre, “to spring back, start back,
rebound, recoil, retreat”, and is often intended and defined as the ability to cope
with or recover from change. As mentioned in Sect. 1, this general definition
has been specialized in different domains, in each of which it has taken domain-
specific traits:
• In ecology, resilience often refers to an ecosystem’s ability to respond to
and recover from an ecological threat [27]. “Recovering” means here the
ability to return to a steady state characterizing the ecosystem before the
manifestation of the threat. The mentioned “steady state” represents the
peculiar characteristics of the resilient ecosystem—its identity.
• In complex socio-ecological systems, resilience is the ability to absorb
stress and maintain function in the face of climate change [22]. “Ab-
sorbing stress” clearly corresponds to the “recovering” ability found in
ecology, though in this context the identity of the system lies in its func-
tion rather than in its state. An additional and peculiar aspect of resilient
systems in this domain is given by their ability to improve systematically
their sustainability.
• In organization science, (organizational) resilience is “the capacity to an-
ticipate disruptions, adapt to events, and create lasting value” [3]. Here
the accents are on proactiveness and adaptation rather than on “spring-
ing back” to a past state or function. Intuitively, one may deduct that
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the former class of behaviors is more advanced than the latter one. One
may also observe how in this case the definition brings to the foreground
a fundamental component of system identity, namely the ability to create
value.
• In social science and human ecology, resilience is “the ability of groups or
communities to cope with external stresses and disturbances as a result of
social, political and environmental change” [1]. Here the recovery strategy
of resilience is not made explicit. System identity implicitly refers to the
identity of groups and communities and ranges from socio-cultural aspects
up to the ability to survive.
• In psychology, “resilience is the process of adapting well in the face of
adversity, trauma, tragedy, threats or significant sources of stress [...] It
means ‘bouncing back’ from difficult experiences” [4]. An important as-
pect here is the identification of resilience as a process: “Resilience should
be considered a process, rather than a trait to be had” [41]; see also [34, 23].
“System” identity is in the case of psychology the collection of beliefs about
oneself.
• In material science, resilience is a material’s property to “stay unaffected
by an applied stress” up to some threshold, called “point of yielding”,
and to “return to its original shape upon unloading” [40]. Beyond the
mentioned threshold, deformation is irreversible: “some residual strain will
persist even after unloading” (ibid.) Here resilience is a property rather
than a process, the key difference being the type of behavior exercised by
the “systems”. System identity is in this case represented by the shape or
the characteristics of the material.
• In civil engineering, resilience is a construction’s ability to absorb or avoid
damage in the face of a natural or man-induced abnormal condition [29],
such as flooding, hurricanes, or firepower. The considerations done in the
case of material science apply also to this case.
• Finally, in computer science, resilience has been defined, e.g., as the ability
to sustain dependability when facing changes [32]. This translates into
the ability to avoid failure and at the same time the ability to sustain the
delivery of trustworthy services. System identity is in this case as in the
following definition.
Definition 1 (System identity) In the framework of artificial, computer-
based systems, system identity is defined as a system’s compliance to its system
specifications and in particular to its functional and non-functional quality of
service and quality of experience requirements.
As already remarked, with the change of the reference domain the above
notions of resilience are applied to a spectrum of entities ranging from simple,
3
passive-behaviored, individual objects to complex, teleological, collective adap-
tive systems. By making use of the behavioral approach introduced by Wiener
et al. in [39], and briefly recalled in Sect. 3.1, in what follows three major classes
in this spectrum are identified.
2.1 Elastic objects and systems
Resilience shall be referred to as elasticity when the system under considera-
tion is only capable of simple types of behaviors: passive behavior and active,
purposeful, non-teleological behaviors. In the former case the system shall be
referred to as an object.
The considerations made above with reference to, e.g., material science, ap-
ply also in this case. In particular, for both objects and servo-mechanisms
resilience (elasticity) is represented as an intrinsic property: a trait.
Elastic systems able to exercise active behaviors are what Boulding refers
to in [7] as “servo-mechanisms”—systems whose action is predefined and is not
modified by the interaction with other systems. In fact servo-mechanisms do
not “interact with other systems outside of themselves” [25]—namely, they are
not open systems.
Elastic systems and objects operate under the assumption that their envi-
ronments are not going to exercise stress beyond their point of yielding. Quoting
N. N. Taleb, they are systems that “do not care too much” about their
Another way to characterize elastic objects and systems is by observing
that they have a predefined and static point of yielding. This introduces two
syndromes, which we call “elastic undershooting” and “elastic overshooting.”
2.1.1 Elastic undershooting
Elastic objects or systems are characterized at design time by a static yielding
point beyond which they permanently lose their identity—for instance, they
deformate; or break down; or fail; or become untrustworthy. The yielding point
is therefore a resilience threshold. Whatever the characteristics of an elastic
object or system, there is always a non-zero probability that the yielding point
will be overcome.
Definition 2 (Elastic undershooting) When at time t an elastic object or
system with yielding point Y is insufficiently resilient with respect to an experi-
enced condition for which a yielding point y(t) would be required, we shall call
elastic undershooting (or simply undershooting, when this may be done without
introducing ambiguity) the dynamic quantity y(t)− Y .
Undershooting is in fact as in a well-known fairy tale [28]: one may make
their house of straw, of wood, or even of bricks; although more and more robust,
each house will “just” shift the yielding point farther away; but that is all:
there is no guarantee that, sooner or later, something stronger will show up and
blow that house down, whatever the material it is made of. Development and
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operating costs, on the other hand, will grow up proportionally to the chosen
yielding point—which brings us to the second syndrome.
2.1.2 Elastic overshooting
The choice of the yielding point represents the ability to cope with a worst-case
scenario regardless of how frequently said condition will actually manifest itself.
Unless the environmental conditions are deterministic and immutable, there will
always be a non-zero probability that the yielding point is more pessimistic than
what the experienced condition would require. In other words, an elastic system
is prepared for the worst; but also it costs and expends resources as if the worst
was actually there all the time.
Definition 3 (Elastic overshooting) When at time t an elastic object or sys-
tem with yielding point Y is resilient with respect to an experienced condition
for which a yielding point y(t) would suffice, we shall call elastic overshooting
(or simply overshooting, when this may be done without introducing ambiguity)
the quantity Y − y(t).
Overshooting reminds of the condition of the shell-snail that, “feeling always
in danger of birds, lives constantly under its shield” [6, p. 147]—thus carrying
its weight at all times regardless of the actual presence or absence of birds.
2.1.3 Observations
Elastic undershooting and overshooting may be better understood when consid-
ering a well-known result by Shannon [47]: given an unreliable communication
channel, it is always possible to transfer information reliably through it provided
that a sufficient amount of information redundancy is foreseen. By means of the
above introduced terminology, Shannon’s result may be formulated as follows:
for any communication channel whose observed unreliability is y(t) throughout
a given time interval T , it is possible to define an elastic communication protocol
with a yielding point
Y > y(t) ∀t ∈ T.
Ideally the choice of Y should be such that Y represents the supremum of all
the unreliability samples y(t) observed during T . In this ideal case, no under-




In more concrete situations in which unreliability drifting is unbound, under-
shooting would occur each time the value chosen for Y would be less than the
observed unreliability of the channel.
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2.2 System entelechies
In Sect. 2 we have concisely reviewed a number of definitions of resilience
emerged in the framework of diverse disciplines and domains. Several of such
definitions explicitly require a resilient system to enact complex forms of behav-
iors: adapt reactively (see, e.g., in ecology and psychology) and adapt proac-
tively (see, e.g., in organizational science). Such behaviors correspond respec-
tively to simple teleological behaviors and extrapolative teleological behaviors
(as defined in [39] and recalled in Sect. 3.1): behaviors that are driven respec-
tively by the current state and by the hypothesized future state of an intended
objective. Obviously in this case resilience cannot be regarded as a trait or
attribute; rather, it is the emerging result of a process. Resilient systems are in
motion to actively pursue the persistence of their system identity. The two just
mentioned aspects correspond to the translation that Joe Sachs provides of the
Aristotelian concept of entelechy1: “being-at-work-staying-itself” [43, 42]. An
entelechy is a system that is able to persist and sustain its completeness through
a resilient process. “Completeness” here is to be intended as the characteristics
that make of a system what it is: its “definition”—or, in other words, its system
identity. Because of this we shall refer to the systems in this resilience class as
to entelechies.
The very nature of entelechies requires them to be able to “interact with
other systems outside of themselves”, namely to be open systems [25]. Such
systems do not “want tranquility” nor expect their environments to be stable
or stay the same. On the contrary, they assume conditions will vary, and adjust
their function to the observed conditions or to speculated future conditions of
their environments.
Another way to distinguish entelechies from elastic objects and systems is
by observing that entelechies are characterized by dynamic and adaptive points
of yielding. Undershootings and overshootings are still possible, though with a
slightly different formulation:
Definition 4 (Entelechial undershooting) When, at time t, an entelechy
with yielding point Y (t) is insufficiently resilient with respect to an experienced
condition for which a yielding point y(t) would be required, we shall call ent-
elechial undershooting (or simply overshooting, when this may be done without
introducing ambiguity) the dynamic quantity y(t)− Y (t).
Definition 5 (Entelechial overshooting) When, at time t, an entelechy
with yielding point Y (t) is resilient with respect to an experienced condition for
which a yielding point y(t) would suffice, we shall call entelechial overshooting
(or simply overshooting, when this may be done without introducing ambiguity)
the quantity Y (t)− y(t).
1Quoting Sachs, “Entelecheia means continuing in a state of completeness, or being at an
end which is of such a nature that it is only possible to be there by means of the continual
expenditure of the effort required to stay there.” [42]
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An exemplary entelechy is given by an adaptive communication protocol
for the reliable communication over an unreliable channel characterized by y(t)
unreliability. Such protocol would continuously “be at work” so as to estimate
past and current values of y(t) and extrapolate with them a future state y(t′).
Once this speculated future value is known, the protocol would “stay itself” by
choosing a yielding point Y (t′) as close as possible but still greater than y(t′).
More formally, the choice for Y (t′) would be such that
0 < Y (t′)−Π(y(t′)) < ε, (1)
where Π(y(t′)) represents a prediction of y(t′) and ε > 0 expresses a safety
margin to cover for inaccuracies in the prediction.
2.3 Antifragile systems
In the light of the discussion in Sect. 2.1 and Sect. 2.2 one may observe that
most of the reported definitions of resilience correspond to either elastic ob-
jects / systems or to entelechies. An exception may be found in the class of
complex socio-ecological systems. There we have systems that “are at work
to stay themselves” (thus, they are entelechies), though are endowed with an
additional feature: the ability “to improve systematically their sustainability”.
Wiener et al. did not explicitly consider behaviors including that ability [39].
The most closely related of their behavioral classes—one could say its genus
proximum [9]—is given by teleological behaviors.
As discussed in more detail in Sect. 3.1, teleological systems are those char-
acterized by a feed-back loop: their behavior
“is controlled by the margin of error at which the [system] stands at
a given time with reference to a relatively specific goal” [39].
Due to its purely behavioral nature, the approach followed in the cited work
does not cover organizational, architectural, and structural aspects. Because of
this, no account is given on the modifications that a teleologically behaviored
system would apply to itself in order to achieve its goal.
At least the following four cases may occur:
1. The feed-back loop is purely exogenous: the system action is simply
steered towards the goal (in its current or hypothesized future position.)
2. The feed-back loop is both exogenous and endogenous. Internal changes
only concerns the “knobs”, namely the parameters of the system. This
case corresponds to parametric adaptation.
3. The feed-back loop is both exogenous and endogenous; the internal changes
adapt the structure of the system. This corresponds to system reconfig-
urations (namely structural adaptation). Adaptations are phenotypical
and do not affect the identity of the system. Furthermore, the experience
leaves no trace on the identity of the system.
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4. The feed-back loop is both exogenous and endogenous; the internal changes
adapt any of the following aspects: the function; the structure; the archi-
tecture; and the organization of the system. Changes are genotypical :
they are persisted and modify permanently the nature of the system.
It is important to remark that, while in cases 1–3 the system is “at work to
stay itself” [43, 42], in case 4 the system is “at work to get better”. At least
in the case of complex socio-ecological systems, teleological behaviors belong to
this fourth category: through their experience, those systems elaborate a feed-
back that is also endogenous and affects the genotypical ability “to improve
systematically their sustainability”. The feed-back thus affects the identity of
the system. Rather than adapting, the system evolves2.
In the case of complex socio-ecological systems, said evolution leads to an
improvement in sustainability: those systems “enhance the level of congruence
or fit between themselves and their surroundings” [49]. This matches the con-
cept introduced by N. N. Taleb in [50]: antifragile systems. Quoting from the
cited reference, “Antifragility is beyond resilience or robustness. The resilient
resists shocks and stays the same; the antifragile gets better.”
In what follows we distinguish explicitly this class of teleological behaviors
and systems by referring to them as to antifragile systems, which we define as
follows:
Definition 6 (Antifragile system) We shall call a system “antifragile” if it
is able to exercise teleological behaviors that evolve the system and its identity
in such a way as to systematically improve the fit with their environment.
By considering the just enunciated definition we can observe that
• Antifragile systems are not necessarily more resilient that entelechies or
elastic objects and systems. As it is the case for those entities, also an-
tifragile systems are characterized by a yielding point—a resilience thresh-
old beyond which they would fail; break down; or become untrustworthy.
• Antifragile systems mutate their system identity. By referring to Def. 1,
this means that the behaviors of antifragile computer-based systems may
drift outside of what prescribed in their specifications. Scenarios such
as those that Stephen Hawking [24] and many others [33] are warning of
become more concrete when considering this particular characteristic of
antifragile systems.
2A distinctive characteristic of both behavioral elasticity and entelechism is their goal being
the persistence of system identity. Now, a strict interpretation of this property translates in
prohibiting any evolution of the system identity. When looking at natural systems we observe
that two concurrent “forces” are used in biological evolution: genealogical persistence of
identity and occasional identity disruption through mutation and Darwinian selection [51, 26].
Those forces are both used to lead species and ecosystems to build ever greater amounts of
complexity and thus to the “evolution of evolvability”, i.e., “the ability of random variations
to sometimes produce improvement.” [54]
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• Antifragile systems must possess some form of awareness of their current
and past system-environment fit; in particular, they must be able to create
and maintain a model of the risk of losing one or more aspects of their
system identity.
Going back to the communication protocol presented in Sect. 2.2, an exem-
plary antifragile system would be a protocol that, in addition to being able to
estimate quantity y(t′), also learns how to mutate its own algorithm so as to
profit from the characteristics of the environment. As an example, instead of
sending, say, Y redundant copies for each of the packets of its messages, the
protocol could realize that a better strategy (with respect to the current behav-
ior of the channel) would be that of interleaving the transmission of packets of
different messages. This would result in a more efficient strategy such that a
higher yielding point would be reached with a consumption of resources lower
than in the original algorithm.
At the same time, it is important to observe how the introduced interleav-
ing would affect several peculiar characteristics of the protocol—for instance,
it would introduce jitter (viz. a drifting in the periodicity of the messages).
Repercussions on the validity of the specifications become then possible. For
instance, if the protocol were intended for a teleconferencing service, the intro-
duced jitter would affect the quality of experience of the users of that service.
Embedding the same protocol in a service insensible to periodicity drifting (such
as a file transferring service) would not translate in a loss of system identity.
2.4 A few observations
As a summary of the discussion in this section, we can derive here a number of
observations:
2.4.1 Resilience is a relative figure
As observed in [16], resilience is a dynamic property whose emergence is influ-
enced by at least the following two factors:
1. The intrinsic characteristics of the system: in particular, whether the
system is elastic, entelechial, or antifragile.
2. The extrinsic “level of congruence or fit between [the system] and [its]
surroundings” [49].
The first factor is absolute in nature and tells how “evolved” the class of the
system is. The second factor is a relative one, and tells how the system’s be-
havior is able to match the conditions currently expressed by the environment.
This second factor makes of resilience a relative figure. Whatever a system’s
structure, organization, architecture, capabilities, and resources, that system is
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resilient only so long as its implementation matches the conditions currently
exercised by the environment3.
2.4.2 Resilience is the product of an interplay between a system and
its environment
As a corollary to what mentioned in Sect. 2.4.1, we observe that resilience is
not a property, but rather the product of a a process. Such process corresponds
to the dynamic interplay between two entities: A system and its environment.
2.4.3 The environment is a system
“Environment” is interpreted here and in what follows simply as another sys-
tem; in particular, as a collective system (in other words, a “system-of-systems”)
taking different shapes, including for instance any combination of cyber-physical
things; biological entities such as human beings; servo-mechanisms; and intelli-
gent ambients able to exercise complex teleological behaviors.
2.4.4 Resilience is an interplay of behaviors
Resilience is one of the possible outcomes of an interplay of behaviors. If and
only if the interplay between the system behaviors and the environmental be-
haviors is one that preserves the system identity then the system will be called
resilient. As discussed in Sect. 3.1, behaviors may range from the random be-
haviors typical of electro-magnetic sources up to the “intelligent”, cybernetic be-
haviors characterizing, e.g., human beings and complex ambient environments.
2.5 Preliminary conclusions
A major conclusion here—and a starting point for the treatise in next section—is
given by the intuitive notion that evaluating resilience must be done not merely
considering a system’s intrinsic characteristics; rather, it should be done by ex-
pressing in some convenient form the dynamic fit between the system and its
environment. This may be obtained, e.g., by comparing the resilience class of
the system with the dynamically mutating resilience class of the environment.
Another, more detailed method could be by comparing the behaviors of sys-
tem and environment. Yet another approach could be to apply the behavioral
comparison method to specific organs of the system and its environment—for
instance those organs that are likely to play a significant role in the emergence
of resilience or its opposite.
In what follows we focus on the last mentioned approach.
3Possibly the first Scholar to have distinguished intrinsic and extrinsic factors towards the
emergence of resilience was G. W. von Leibniz [15].
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3 Resilient Behaviors, Organs, and Methods
In order to proceed with the present treatise we first recall in Sect. 3.1 the major
classes of behaviors according to the classic discussion by Rosenblueth, Wiener,
and Bigelow [39]. After this, in Sect. 3.2, five major services that play a key role
towards the emergence of resilience are identified. Finally in Sect. 3.3 we use the
concepts introduced so far to reformulate definitions for elasticity, entelechism,
and antifragility.
3.1 Behavioral classification
As already mentioned, Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow introduced in [39] the
concept of the “behavioristic study of natural events”, namely “the examination
of the output of the object and of the relations of this output to the input”4.
The term “object” in the cited paper corresponds to that of “system”. In that
renowned text the authors purposely “omit the specific structure and the in-
trinsic organization” of the systems under scrutiny and classify them exclusively
on the basis of the quality of the “change produced in the surroundings by the
object”, namely the system’s behavior. The authors identify in particular four
major classes of behaviors5:
βran : Random behavior. This is an active form of behavior that does not
appear to serve a specific purpose or reach a specific state. A source of
electro-magnetic interference exercises random behavior.
βpur : Purposeful, non-teleological behavior. This is behavior that serves a
purpose and is directed towards a specific goal. In purposeful behavior a
“final condition toward which the movement [of the object] strives” can be
identified. Servo-mechanisms provide an example of purposeful behavior.
βrea : Reactive, teleological, non-evolutive behavior. This is behavior that “in-
volve[s] a continuous feed-back from the goal that modifies and guides
the behaving object”. Examples of this behavior include phototropism,
namely the tendency that can be observed, e.g., in certain plants, to grow
towards the light, and gravitropism, viz. the tendency of plant roots to
grow downwards. As already mentioned (see Sect. 2.2), reactive behav-
iors require the system to be open [25] (i.e., able to continuously perceive,
communicate, and interact with external systems and the environment)
and to embody some form of feedback loop. Class βrea is non-evolutive,
meaning that the experienced change does not influence the identity of
the system (cf. Sect. 2.3).
βpro : Proactive, teleological, non-evolutive behavior. This is behavior directed
towards the extrapolated future state of the goal. The authors in [39]
classify proactive behavior according to its “order”, namely the amount
4If not otherwise specified the quotes in the present section are from [39].
5For the sake of brevity passive behavior shall not be discussed here.
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of context variables taken into account in the course of the extrapolation.
As class βrea, so class βpro is non-evolutive.
By considering the arguments in Sect. 2.3 a fifth class can be added:
βant : teleological evolutive behaviors. This is the behavior emerging from an-
tifragile systems (see Sect. 2.3 for more detailed on this class of systems).
Each of the above five classes may see their systems operate in isolation or
through some form of social interaction. In order to differentiate these two cases
we add the following attribute:
σ(b) : True when b is a social behaviors. This attribute identifies behaviors
based on the social interaction with other systems deployed in the same
environment. Examples of such behaviors include, among others, mu-
tualistic, commensalistic, parasitic, co-evolutive, and co-opetitive behav-
iors [8, 5]. For more information the reader is referred to K. Boulding’s
discussion in his classic paper [7] and, for a concise survey of social behav-
iors, to [17].
The resilience classes introduced in Sect. 2 can now be characterized in terms
of the above behavioral classes: elastic systems correspond to βpur; non-evolving
entelechies exercise either βrea or βpro behaviors; while, as already mentioned,
βant pertains to antifragile systems.
We shall define pi as a projection map returning, for each of the above be-
havior classes, an integer in {1, . . . , 5} (pi(βran) = 1, . . . , pi(βant) = 5). Aim of
pi is twofold: it associates an integer “identifier” to each behavioral class and
it introduces an “order” among classes. Intuitively, the higher is the order of
class, the more complex is the behavior.
In what follows it is assumed that behaviors manifest themselves by changing
the state of measurable properties. As an example, behavior may translate into
a variation in the electromagnetic spectrum perceived as a change in luminosity
or color. Context figures is the term that shall be used in what follows to refer
to those measurable properties.
For any behavior βx dependent on a set of context figures F , notation β
F
x
will be used to denote that βx is exercised by considering the context figures in
F . Thus if, for instance, F = (speed, luminosity), then βFrea refers to a reactive
behavior that responds to changes in speed and light.
For any behavior βx and any integer n > 0, notation β
n
x will be used to
denote that βx is exercised by considering n context figures, without specifying
which ones.
As an example, behavior β
|F |
pro, with F defined as above, identifies an order-2
proactive behavior, while βFpro says in addition that that behavior considers both
speed and luminosity to extrapolate the future position of the goal.
Now the concept of partial order among behaviors is introduced.
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Definition 7 (Partial order of behaviors) Given any two behaviors β1 and
β2, β1 ≺ β2 if and only if either of the following conditions holds:
1. (pi(β1) ≤ pi(β2)) ∧
(∃(F,G) : β1 = βF1 ∧ β2 = βG2 ∧ F ( G).
In other words, β1 ≺ β2 if (1) β1 belongs to a behavioral class that is at
most equal to β2’s (via function pi) and (2) β2 is based on a set of context
figures that extends β1’s.
2. (pi(β1) ≤ pi(β2)) ∧
(
∃(F,G) : β1 = β|F |1 ∧ β2 = β|G|2 ∧ F ( G
)
.
This case is equivalent to case 1, the only difference being in the notation
o the behavior.
3. (pi(β1) = pi(β2)) ∧ (σ(β1) = false) ∧ (σ(β2) = true).
In other words, β1 ≺ β2 also when both β1 and β2 belong to the same
behavioral class, though β2 is a social behavior while β1 is not.
For any two resilient systems p1 and p2, respectively characterized by be-
havioral classes β1 and β2, if β1 ≺ β2 then p1 is said to exhibit “systemically
inferior” resilience with respect to p2.
It is important to observe that ≺ is about the intrinsic resilience characteris-
tics of the system (see Sect. 2.4.1). Partial order ≺ does not tell which system is
“more resilient”; it highlights that for instance system “dog” is able to exercise
behaviors that are less complex than those of system “man”. This tells nothing
about the extrinsic “level of congruence or fit” [49] that for instance a “man”
or a “dog” may exhibit in a given environment. As exemplified, e.g., in [14],
when a threat is announced by ultrasonic noise, a “dog” able to perceive the
threat and flee could result more resilient than a “man”. The use of sentinel
species [46] is in fact a social behavior based on this fact. An application of this
principle is given in Sect. 5.
3.2 Resilience organs
As done in [16] it is conjectured here that reasoning about a system’s resilience is
facilitated by considering the behaviors of the system organs that are responsible
for the following abilities:
M: the ability to perceive change;
A: the ability to ascertain the consequences of change;
P: the ability to plan a line of defense against threats deriving from change;
E: the ability to enact the defense plan being conceived in step P;
K: and, finally, the ability to treasure up past experience and systematically
improve, to some extent, abilities M, A, P, and E.
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These abilities correspond to the components of the so-called MAPE-K loop
of autonomic computing [30]. In the context of the present paper the system
components responsible for those abilities shall be referred to as “resilience
organs”.
The following notation shall be used to refer to organ O of system s: s.O
(for O∈ {M, . . . ,K}).
Definition 8 (Cybernetic class) For any system s the 5-tuple corresponding
to the behaviors associated to its resilience organs,
(s.M, s.A, s.P, s.E, s.K),
shall be referred to as the cybernetic class of s.
Two observations are important for the sake of our discussion.
Observation 1 (Intrinsic resilience) A system’s cybernetic class puts to the
foreground how intrinsically resilient that system is (see again Sect. 2.4.1) and
makes it easier to compare whether certain resilience organs (or the whole sys-
tem) are (resp., is) systemically inferior to (those of) another system.
As an example, the adaptively redundant data structures described in [20] have
the following cybernetic class:
C1 = (βpur, β1pro, βpur, βpur, ∅),
while the adaptive N -version programming system introduced in [10, 11] is
C2 = (βpur, β2pro, βpur, βpur, βpur).
By comparing the above 5-tuples C1 and C2 one may easily realize how the
major strength of those two systems lies in their analytic organs, both of which
are capable of proactive behaviors (βpro)—though in a simpler fashion in C1.
Another noteworthy difference is the presence of a knowledge organ in C2, which
indicates that the second system is able to accrue and make use of the past
experience in order to improve—to some extent—its action6.
Please note that not all the behaviors introduced in Sect. 3.1 may be applied
to all of a system’s organs. For instance, it would make little sense to have a
perception organ behave randomly (unless one wants to model, e.g., the effect
of certain hallucinogenic substances in chemical warfare7.)
6The presence of a knowledge organ does not mean that its system is antifragile. In the case
at hand, for instance, the system does not mutate it system identity—it stays an N -version
programming system.
7See for instance the interview with Dr. James S. Ketchum, in the Sixties a leading
psychiatrist at the Army Chemical Center at Edgewood Arsenal in Maryland, US: “With BZ
[3-quinuclidinyl benzilate], the individual becomes delirious, and in that state is unable to
distinguish fantasy from reality, and may see, for instance, strips of bacon along the edge of
the floor.” [48]
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Observation 2 (Extrinsic resilience) A system’s cybernetic class puts to
the foreground also how extrinsically resilient that system is if the above com-
parison is done between the cybernetic class of the system and the dynamically
evolving cybernetic class of the environment (see Sect. 2.4.1). This comparison
represents a system-environment fit, in turn indicating the property emerging
from the interplay between the current state of the system and the current state
of the environment—in other words, whether the system is likely to either pre-
serve or lose its peculiar features because of the interaction with the environment.
In the former case the system shall be called as “resilient;” in the second case,
“unresilient.”
3.3 Again on elasticity, entelechism, and antifragility
The model and approach introduced thus far provide us with a conceptual frame-
work for alternative definitions of elasticity, entelechism, and antifragility—
namely the resilience classes introduced in Sect. 2.
Definition 9 (Elasticity) Given a system s and its cybernetic class Cs, with
s deployed in environment e, s shall be called “elastic” with respect to e if s is
resilient (in the sense expressed in Observation 2) and if the behaviors in Cs are
purposeful (βpur) and defined, once and for all, at design or deployment time.
Elasticity corresponds to simple, static behaviors that make use of a system’s
predefined internal characteristics and resources so as to mask the action of
external forces. Those characteristics and resources take the shape of various
forms of redundancy which is used to mask, rather than tolerate, change.
Definition 10 (Entelechism) Given a system s and its cybernetic class Cs,
with s deployed in environment e, s shall be referred to as “entelechy” with
respect to e if s is resilient (in the sense expressed in Observation 2) and if the
behaviors corresponding to the A and P organs of Cs are either of type βrea or
βpro. Entelechism, or change tolerance, is defined as the property exhibited by
an entelechy.
As evident from their definition, entelechies are open, context-aware systems;
able to autonomically repair their state in the face of disrupting changes; and
able to guarantee their system identity. A knowledge organ may or may not
be present and, depending on that, the feed-back organs may or may not be
stateful—meaning that “memory” of the experienced changes is or is not re-
tained.
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Definition 11 (Computational antifragility) Given a system s and its cy-
bernetic class Cs, with s deployed in environment e, we shall say that s is com-
putationally antifragile with respect to e when the following conditions are all
met:
1. The awareness organ of s, A, is open to the system-environment fit be-
tween s and e. In particular, as suggested in Sect. 2.3, this means that A
implements a model of the risk of losing one or more aspects of the system
identity of s. One such model is exemplified, e.g., by the distance-to-failure
function introduced in [19] and discussed in [12].
2. Throughout time intervals in which the behavior of e is stable, the planning
organ P is able to monotonically improve extrinsic resilience (see Obs. 2)
and thus optimize risk/performance trade-offs.
3. Organ P evolves through machine learning or other machine-oriented ex-
periential learning [31], leading s to evolve towards ever greater intrinsic
(systemic) resilience (see Obs. 1).
4. Organ K is stateful and persists lessons learned from the experience and
its “conceptualization.”
Computationally antifragile systems are system-environment fit-aware sys-
tems; able to embody and persist systemic improvements suggested by the
match of the current system identity with the current environmental condi-
tions. The learning activity possibly implies a 4-stage cycle similar to the one
suggested by Kolb in [31], executed concurrently with the resilience behaviors
of the M, A, P, and E organs.
4 Approach
As already mentioned, a methodological assumption in the present article is that
the evolution of an environment may be expressed as a behavior. Said behavior
may be of any of the types listed in Sect. 3.1 and Sect. 3.3 and it may result
in the dynamic variation of a number of “firing context figures”. In fact those
figures characterize and, in a sense, set the boundaries of an ecoregion, namely
“an area defined by its environmental conditions” [2]. An environment may be
the behavioral result of the action of, e.g., a human being (a “user”); or the
software agents managing an intelligent ambient; or for instance it may be the
result of purposeless (random) behavior—such as a source of electro-magnetic
interference. As a consequence, an environment may for instance behave (or
appear to behave) randomly, or it may exhibit a recognizable trend; in the latter
case the variation of its context figures may be such that it allows for tracking
or speculation (extrapolation of future states). Moreover, an environment may
exhibit the same behavior for a relatively long period of time or it may vary
frequently its character.
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Figure 1: Exemplification of turbulence, namely the dynamic evolution of en-
vironmental or systemic behavior. Abscissas represent time, “now” being the
current time. Ordinates are the behavior classes exercised by either the envi-
ronment or the system.
Given an environment (or a system), the dynamic evolution of the envi-
ronmental (resp. systemic) behavior shall be referred to in what follows as
“turbulence”. Diagrams such as the one in Fig. 1 may be used to represent the
dynamic behavioral evolution of either environments or systems.
Whenever two behaviors β1 and β2 are such that β1 ≺ β2, it is possible to
define some notion of distance between the two behaviors. One way to define
such “behavioral metric function” would be by encoding the characteristics of
each behavior onto the bits of a binary word, with the three most significant
bits encoding the projection map of the behavior and the bits from the fourth
onward encoding the cardinality of the set of context figures or the order of the
behavior. When the behaviors belong to the same class although consider two
different context sets, say F and G, then a simpler formulation of a distance
would be abs(|F | − |G|). Let us call dist one such metric function.
It is now possible to propose a definition of two indicators for the extrinsic
quality of resilience: The system supply relative to an environment and the
system-environment fit.
Definition 12 (System supply) Let us consider a system s deployed in an
environment e, characterized respectively by behaviors βs(t) and βe(t). Let us
assume that β1 and β2 are such that either β1 ≺ β2 or β2 ≺ β1. Given a
behavioral metric function dist defined as above, the following value shall be
called as supply of s(t) with respect to βe(t):
supply(s, e, t) =
=

dist(βs(t), βe(t)) if βe(t) ≺ βs(t)
−dist(βs(t), βe(t)) if βs(t) ≺ βe(t)
0 if β
e(t) and βs(t)
express the same behaviors.
Supply can be positive (referred to as “oversupply”), negative (“undersup-
ply”), or zero (“perfect supply”).
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Observation 3 Oversupply and undersupply provide a quantitative formulation
of the notions of overshooting and undershooting given in Sect. 2.
Definition 13 (System-environment fit) Given the same conditions as in
Definition 12, the following function:
fit(s, e, t) =
=
{
1/(1 + supply(s, e, t)) if supply(s, e, t) ≥ 0
−∞ otherwise.
shall be referred to as “system-environment fit of s and e at time t.”
The above definition expresses system-environment fit as a function return-
ing 1 in the case of best fit; slowly scaling down with oversupply; and returning
−∞ in case of undersupply. The reason for the infinite penalty in case of under-
supply is due to the fact that it signifies an undershooting or, in other words, a
loss of system identity.
The just enunciated formulation is of course not the only possible one: an
alternative one could be, for instance, by having supply2 instead of supply in
the denominator of fit in Def. 13. Another formulation could extend optimal fit
to a limited region of oversupply as a safety margin to cover for inaccuracies in
the prediction of the behavior of the environment. This is similar to the role of
ε in (1).
Figure 2 exemplifies a system-environment fit in the case of two behaviors
βs and βe with s ( e. Environment e affects five context figures identified by
integers 1, . . . , 5 while s affects context figures 1, . . . , 4. The system behavior
is assumed to be constant, thus for instance if s is a perception organ then it
constantly monitors the four context figures 1, . . . , 4. On the contrary βe varies
with time. Five time segments are exemplified (s1, . . . , s5) during which the
following context figures are affected:
s1 : Context figures 1, . . . , 4.
s2 : Context figure 1 and context figure 4.
s3 : Context figure 4.
s4 : Context figures 1, . . . , 4.
s5 : Context figures 1, . . . , 5.
Context figures are represented as boxed integers, with an empty box meaning
that the figure is not affected by the behavior of the environment and a filled
box meaning the figure is affected. The behavior of the environment is constant
within a time segment and changes at the next one. This is shown through the
sets at the bottom of Fig. 2: for each segment ts ∈ {s1, . . . , s5} the superset is
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Figure 2: Exemplification of supply and system-environment fit.
e(ts) while the subset is s(st), namely e(st) ∩ s. The relative supply and the
system-environment fit also change with the time segments. During s1 and s4
there is perfect supply and best fit: the behavior exercised by the environment
is evenly matched by the features of the system. During s2 and s3 we have
overshootings: the systemic features are more than enough to match the current
environmental conditions. It is a case of oversupply. Correspondingly, fit is
rather low. In s5 the opposite situation takes place: the systemic features—for
instance, pertaining to a perception organ—are insufficient to become aware
of all the changes produced by the environment. In particular here changes
associated with context figure 5 go undetected. This is a case of undersupply
(that is to say, undershooting), corresponding to a loss of identity: the “worst
possible” system-environment fit.
4.1 Supply- and fit-aware behaviors
Whenever a partial order “≺” exists between a system’s and its environment’s
behaviors it is possible to consider system behaviors of the following forms:
1. Either b = βFpro or b = β
F
ant, with σ(b) = false and with F including figures
that provide a measure of the risk of unresilience, expressed, e.g., through
supply and fit.
Such behavior corresponds to condition 1 in Def. 11, namely one of the
necessary conditions to computational antifragility. When exercised by
system organs for analysis, planning, and knowledge management, this
behavior translates in the possibility to become aware of and speculate
about the possible future resilience requirements. If this is coupled with
the possibility to revise one’s system organs by enabling or disabling, e.g.,
the ability to perceive certain context figures depending on the extrapo-
lated future environmental conditions, then a system could use this be-
havior to improve proactively its own system-environment fit—possibly
mutating its features and functions.
An exemplary system based on this feature is given by the already men-
tioned adaptively redundant data structures of [20] and the adaptive N -
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version programming system introduced in [10, 11]. Those systems make
use of so-called reflective variables [19] in order to perceive changes in a
“distance-to-failure” function. Such function basically measures the prob-
ability of failure of a voting scheme at the core of the replication strategies
adopted in the mentioned systems. In other words, such function estimates
the probability of undersupply for voting-based software systems.
2. Behavior b defined as in case 1, but with σ(b) = true.
In this case the analysis, planning and knowledge organs are aware of other
systems in physical or logical proximity and may use this fact to artificially
augment or reduce their system features by establishing / disestablishing
mutualistic relationships with neighboring systems. An example of this
strategy is sketched in Sect. 5.
Note how both behaviors 1 and 2 may evolve the system beyond its current
identity. In case 2 the behavior augments the social “scale” of the system,
which becomes a part of a greater whole—in other words, a resilient collective
system [18].
As a final remark, we observe how the formulation of system-environment
fit adopted in the present article may be augmented so as to include other
factors—for instance, overheads and costs.
5 Scenario
In the present section the approach introduced in Sect. 4 is exemplified through
an ambient scenario. As we did in [13], also our scenario here is inspired by
the use of so-called sentinel species [46], namely systems or animals able to
compensate for another species’ insufficient perception. We now introduce the
main actors in our scenario.
5.1 Coal Mine
Our ambient is called “Coal Mine”. Reason for this name is to highlight how
the behavior of this ambient may randomly change from a neutral state (NS) to
a threatening state (TS), as it occasionally occurs in “real life” coal mines when
high concentrations of toxic substances—e.g., carbon monoxide and dioxide, or
methane—manifest themselves. (Toxic gases in high concentration are lethal to
both animals and human beings.)
By making use of the terminology introduced in Sect. 3.1 and Sect. 3.2 we
shall refer to the behaviors of Coal Mine as to βCM = β
T
ran, where T represents
a context set including a figure, let us call it t, telling whether Coal Mine is in
its neutral or threatening state.




Miner is a system whose intrinsic resilience (see Obs. 1) is very high: Miner’s
resilience organs are capable of advanced behaviors, including perception of a
wide range of context figures; proactive analysis and planning; and a knowledge
organ able to persist lessons learned from experience.
In particular, let us refer to βM as to the behavior of the perception organ
of the Miner (that is to say, Miner.M). Let us assume βM to be a purposeful




In what follows we assume T \{t} ( F , and t /∈ F . Those assumptions mean
that Miner.M can become aware of any type of changes in Coal Mine, with the
exception of a NS-to-TS transition. Miner is thus unable to perceive the threat
and therefore it is unresilient with respect to Coal Mine.
5.3 Canary
Let us now suppose we have a second system called “Canary”. Canary’s or-
gans are all intrinsically inferior (cf. Obs. 1) with respect to Miner’s, with the
exception of its perception organ, Canary.M. Let us call βC the behavior of
Canary.M. In what follows we assume βC to be equal to β
G
pur for some set G of
context figures. In addition, we assume that both F ( G and G ( F are false.
Miner.M and Canary.M are thus incommensurable—none of the conditions in
Def. 7 apply: neither Miner.M ≺ Canary.M nor Canary.M ≺ Miner.M is true.
5.4 Discussion
The advanced features of the Analysis, Planning, and Knowledge organs of
Miner allowed it to deduct two relevant facts:
1. t ∈ G. In other words, despite its comparably simpler nature, Canary
can detect a NS-to-TS transition in Coal Mine—what in a “physical” coal
mine would represent a dangerous increase in the concentration of toxic
gases.
2. Canary is more susceptible than Miner [38] to the persistence of the TS
state in Coal Mine. In other words, when deployed in Coal Mine in its
threatening state, Canary is likely to experience general failures (what we
could refer to as “total losses of the system identity”) much sooner than
Miner.
Miner thus realizes that, by bringing along instances of the Canary system
and by monitoring for their condition and failures, it may artificially augment
its perception organ. This technique is known as biomonitoring [52]. The new
collective system Miner+Canary is now characterized by a perception organ
whose behavior is of type βF∪Gpur . Let us refer to Miner+Canary as to MC.
Now, as t ∈ G, it follows that T ( F ∪G. This matches one of the conditions
in Def. 7, thus βCM ≺ βMC.M. Behaviors are now commensurable, and it is
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possible to deduct that Coal Mine now exhibits “systemically inferior” resilience
with respect to the monitoring organ of MC.
It is now possible to define a strategy based on Miner and multiple instances
of Canary.
5.5 Strategy
First we estimate the supply of Miner.M with respect to Coal Mine. The
estimation is based on a probabilistic assessment of the distance between the two
involved behaviors. Said assessment is formulated by considering the amount of
Canary replicas that have failed out of a predefined maximum equal to |c|:
float EstimateSupply (Coal Mine cm,Miner m,Canary c[ ])
Begin
1 int f = 0
2 Query state of the Canary instances c deployed in cm;
3 For each failed Canary in c, increment f ;
4 return |c|/2.0− f ;
End
Secondly, through the estimated supply we can derive an estimated fit as
follows:
float EstimateFit (Coal Mine cm,Miner m,Canary c[ ])
Begin
1 float supply = EstimateSupply(cm,m, c[ ]);
2 if supply ≥ 0 then return 1/(1 + supply);
3 else return FLOAT MIN;
End
By executing a function like EstimateFit, Miner evolves into a collective
system by means of a βsoc behavior. Said behavior augments the system’s
social scale, embedding the system into a greater “whole”. In this case the
established social relationship is parasitic rather than mutualistic, as it enhances
the resilience of one of the partners at the expenses of the other one.
5.6 Final remarks
The just described scenario is clearly an exemplary simplification. A full fledged
example would see a much more complex confrontation of behaviors of differ-
ent organs and at different system scales. A possible conceptual framework for
modeling such “behavioral confrontations” may be found in Evolutionary Game
Theory [45] (EGT). In EGT the system and its deployment environment could
be modeled as opponents that confront behavioral strategies of the classes dis-
cussed in this paper. This interpretation matches particularly well cases where
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Figure 3: Estimations of supply and fit when 100 instances of Canary are used.
Abscissas represent the number of failed Canary instances.
either or both of the environment and the system explicitly aim at threatening
their opponent, as it is typical of certain security scenarios.
As a last remark, we observe how detecting incommensurability between
a system’s behavior and its environment’s provides the system with aware-
ness of the need to establish a social relationship—a new behavior b such that
σ(b) =true—such as a mutualistic or a parasitic relationship.
6 Conclusions
This paper discusses resilience as the behavior resulting from the coupling of a
system and its environment. Depending on the interactions between these two
“ends” and on the quality of the individual behaviors that they may exercise,
resilience may take the form of elasticity (change masking); entelechism (change
tolerance); or antifragility (adapting to and learning from change). Following
the lesson of Leibniz [15], resilience is decomposed in this paper into an intrinsic
and an extrinsic component—the former representing the static, “systemic” as-
pects of a resilience design, the latter measuring the contingent match between
that design and the current environmental conditions. It is conjectured that
optimal resilience may be more easily attained through behaviors that are not
constrained by the hard requirement of preserving the system identity. Such
“antifragile behaviors” are exemplified through a scenario in which a system
establishes a parasitic relationship with a second system in order to artificially
augment its perception capability. Finally, we observe how several of the con-
cepts discussed in this paper match well with corresponding concepts in EGT. In
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particular, the choice of which behavior to enact corresponds with the choice of a
strategy; resilience is the outcome of an interplay—a “game”; and the interplay
between the “players” (system and environment, as well as their organs) trans-
lates in penalties and rewards. Because of those similarities it is conjectured
here that a possible framework for the design of optimal resilience strategies
may be given through EGT, by modeling both system and environment as two
opponents choosing behavioral strategies with the explicit purpose to “win” the
adversary. In this new model we shall distinguish between a system’s behavior
and a system’s manifested behavior. The former is what we have focused on in
this paper and characterizes the “systemic class” of the system—what the sys-
tem is capable to do. The latter is the behavior the system decides to manifest;
it is a “move” in a confrontation between two opponents. Thus for instance
an intelligent agent able to exercise advanced behaviors may decide to behave
(pseudo-)randomly so as to, e.g., confuse the opponent, or even to cause the
opponent choose a yielding point and then use this information to “attack” it
and lead it to an undershooting. Future work will include proposing one such
model and assessing its benefits.
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